Development and impediments to integrated water resource management in Chile are presented. Sustainable water use supports social objectives into the indefinite future without undermining environmental and hydrological integrity. International consensus exists that integrated water management and watershed management form a sound basis for sustainable water use. Increased water user conflicts, water quality degradation, recognition of economic inefficiencies, acknowledgment of ecological flows requirements, and public good issues are leading toward a more integrated and watershed based approach to water management in Chile. Despite these issues and concerted effort since the early 1990s, however, integrated water resource management and watershed management has not yet materialized and progress remains slow. Impediments in Chile to integrated water resource management include opposition due to political dogma and special interest groups, as well as lack of stakeholder participation and enabling legislation.
Introduction
Sustainable water use supports social objectives into the indefinite future without undermining environmental and hydrological integrity (ASCE & UNESCO 1998; Gleick et al. 1995) . International consensus exists that integrated water management and watershed management form a sound basis for sustainable water use and an effective means by which to achieve many poverty reduction goals set at the Rio + 10 forum in Johannesburg in (Argawal et al. 2000 CEPAL 1998; Cosgrove & Rijsberman 2000; Guerquin et al. 2003) . Increased water user conflicts, water quality degradation, recognition of economic inefficiencies, acknowledgment of ecological flows requirements, and public good issues are leading toward a more integrated and watershed based approach to water management in Chile. Despite these issues and concerted effort since the early 1990s, however, integrated water resource management and watershed management has not yet materialized and progress remains slow. Impediments in Chile to integrated water resource management include opposition due to political dogma and special interest groups, as well as lack of stakeholder participation and enabling legislation. In this paper water management in Chile is presented, with focused discussion on the benefits of integrated water resource management and current impediments to its implementation.
Integrated Water Resource Management
There is growing recognition that fresh water is a finite resource that provides social, economic, and environmental services (CEPAL 1998; Cosgrove & Rijsberman 2000; Guerquin et al. 2003) . Water is an essential element to sustain people through water supply, sanitation, and food security (Rosegrant et al. 2002) . At the same time, rivers and freshwater ecosystems provide environmental services that benefit society (Postel and Carpenter 1997) , while others value nature for its intrinsic and spiritual value (Callicott 1994; Sessions 1995; Zimmerman et al. 1998) . Water serves multiple uses and objectives, some of which are at odds with one another, which points toward the concept of integrating its management to address multiple uses and objectives, in other words Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM).
The precise definition and implementation of IWRM remains under debate. However, international consensus exists that the basis of IWRM is founded in the Dublin principles:
• Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, development and the environment; • Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels; • Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of water; • Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.
IWRM can be defined as a process by which to promote the integrated and coordinated management of water (and land) . It is a mechanism to account for all its uses; allow for community and user participation; and to better allocate, use, and conserve the resource in a sustainable manner (Argarwal et al. 2000; ASCE & UNESCO 1998; Gleick et al. 1995) . Guidance documents indicate possible manners to put these concepts into practice (Argarwal et al. 2000) , while also chronicling current actions being undertaken throughout the world to better manage the resource in an integrated and sustainable manner (Guerquin et al. 2003) .
IWRM can provide a forum to better address items such as:
• Multiple water use objectives, including trade-offs between differing water uses (especially when insufficient water exists to satisfy all needs); • Improving water quality outcomes;
• Improving economic and water use efficiency;
• Mitigating water user conflicts;
• Evaluating effects and alternatives of hydraulic works;
• Conserving environmental habitat and biodiversity; • Considering social equity;
• Fomenting participation;
• Allowing improved compilation and effective use of information.
Historically, water-governing institutions have arisen piece-meal and by sectors to address specific items, often where there was need for collective action, water scarcity, conflict, or an overarching objective, like economic development. While there are commonalities, a universal design or breadth of IWRM institutions does not exist; institutions reflect local situations, customs, and objectives (Argawal et al. 2000; Lee 1999 ).
Background to Chilean Water Management
Chile is a middle-income country of 15 million inhabitants, 6 million who live in Santiago (USDS 2002) . During the military ruled government in Chile (1973-90) , a neoliberal socioeconomic model was established based on free market principles and export-oriented growth, largely based on export of primary products: mining, agriculture, forestry, and fish. The government assumed a secondary role in many aspects of the economy. Water and environmental goods were treated largely as economic commodities. With transition to democracy, additional attention has been afforded to environmental protection and social concerns (Ffrench-Davis 1999; Hudson 1994; Oppenheim 1999) . Consequently, over the past 30 years increased pressure has been exerted on water resources, including increased extractions, water quality degradation, and growing water user conflicts (Brown and Saldivia 2000; Bauer 1998; Salazar 2003; Pizarro et al. 1999) .
Physically, the country stretches 4,270 km, from 17° 12' to 56° 32' southern latitude, while averaging only 177 km from east to west. Typically, watersheds are relatively small, with steep, short rivers that run from east to west. Water resource availability varies substantially by longitudinal location, with arid and semiarid conditions in the north and center of the country, the principal areas of population and economic activity. Due to the physical configuration and size of watersheds, as well as location of human activities, relatively few water users exist in each watershed (in comparison to many watersheds in the world). Moreover, Chile shares few watersheds with neighboring countries.
Legal Control of Water Management
Water management is shared between public and private sectors (Figure 1 ). In practice, the government plays a regulatory and support role in many facets of water management. Regulatory oversight is carried out by several government agencies under the auspices of the Water Code (largely water quantity), Sanitary Code, water quality regulations, and Environmental Framework Law (EFL). The Water Code was promulgated under the military regime and reflects the neoliberal socioeconomic model. The Sanitary Code provides rules for supply of water and sanitation services. Water quality regulations have been instituted recently and represent a mix of command and control, and economic incentives.
The EFL provides for environmental regulation setting, planning, and a system of environmental impact assessment (EIA) (Fuentes 1999; Jofré 2003) . The National Water Directorate (DGA) carries out many functions: delivers initial water rights, maintain water rights records, collects and disseminates water resources and quality information, performs general water resources planning, and reviews technical aspects of hydraulic projects. The Superintendency of Sanitary Services serves as overseer of the privatized or autonomous water and sanitary purveyors (WSPs), as well as assists in water quality and emissions documentation and enforcement. The Ministry of Energy also retains limited regulatory functions in private hydropower generation. The Hydraulic Works Directorate (DOH) designs and constructs hydraulic projects, including reservoirs to benefit agriculture and flood protection works. It operates some reservoirs and conducts outreach programs. The National Environmental Commission (CONAMA) oversees environmental regulations (including water quality) and the system of environmental impact assessment (review of certain hydraulic works). Water quality regulations were promulgated in the last five years and include industrial discharge and ambient water quality standards and objectives, and tradable discharge permits (Jofré 2003) . Since 1997, it is mandatory for certain classes of proposed hydraulic projects to submit an EIA to CONAMA for review (DGA 1999; Fuentes 1999) .
Lack of Integrated Water Resource Management
Existing legislation and management practices do not address IWRM nor watershed management. Water quantity, water quality, and ecological issues are governed by separate legislation; each one does not take full cognizance of provisions in the others. Several inefficiencies, externalities, conflicts, and lack of stakeholder representation currently exist. The benefits of introducing IWRM would be to eliminate or minimize these items and use water in a more sustainable manner. Some aspects of lack of IWRM are discussed below. hoarding, speculating, and hedging of water rights (Bauer 1998; Hadjigeorgalis 1999) . Thus, it is likely that in many watersheds the full complement of water is not serving its highest economic use. Furthermore, there is little incentive to use water efficiently. Potentially one could invest in water use efficiency and sell extra water rights, but apparently this is not common. More common is to increase water use efficiency to produce more on one's property. This has occurred in areas of high value (and often export) crops (Hadjigeorgalis 1999) but is not pervasive elsewhere. Also, private efficiency in a market does not equate to basin efficiency or socially efficiency or sustainability (Dourojeanni & Berrios 1996; Rodgers et al. 2000) . Last, little effort to date has occurred to conjunctively use surface and groundwater in a efficient manner. In fact, rapid increase (and overexploitation) of groundwater from the 1980s to date has required stepped up regulations in 1996 regarding groundwater extractions and public inventories, as well as numerous groundwater modeling studies (e.g. DGA 1996).
Inefficiencies

Externalities and Conflicts
These represent adverse impacts on third parties. Private water rights trades are not subject to formal regulatory review. Water right trades can impact water quality and quantity and produce adverse impacts on other water users. In some basins with more sophisticated Water User Associations (WUAs), like in Elqui Valley, the WUA review a transaction's effect on other water rights holders (Lee 1999) . However, no review occurs with respect to adverse effects on ecology and habitat, aesthetics, or other items associated with public goods. The Elqui Valley WUA is atypical in that it encompasses the entire watershed. In most, WUAs consist of legally defined river Sections. User conflicts exist between WUAs as well as between hydropower and other users. Conflicts carried forward to court cases have resulted in inconsistent outcomes (Bauer 1998 ).
Existing water rights, moreover, do not address water quality. Water quality issues, however, are being addressed through a parallel program (Jofré 2003) . In the first section of the Maipo watershed, for example, continual problems were encountered between a paper and pulp factory and downstream agriculture. Promulgation of legal industrial discharge standard rules and persistent discussion resulted in addressing the problem (Carvallo 1998) . Problems still exist and are more pervasive in areas without export industries.
Legally, instream flows are considered as part of third party impacts when assessing initial water rights requests. Further consideration is made when evaluating a EIAs of hydraulic projects. Generally, only a portion of the river is evaluated and cumulative impacts of several planned projects ignored, although assessment is improving drastically since 2000. Instream flow requirements for ecological reasons have not been assessed in most rivers (Davis & Riestra 2002) , while threatened or endangered species have been identified in all but one river (Campos et al. 1998 ).
Externalities and conflicts are also present in groundwater, through lowering the groundwater table and its associated economic impacts on groundwater users and potential adverse stream effects from increased infiltration from streams in some locations. In a groundwater study in the Chacabuco area north of Santiago that I undertook in 1997, nearly 50% of wells at the time were unregistered and groundwater use exceeded safe yield. A marked increase in the number of wells occurred in the 1990s when drought conditions prevailed and access to stress existed on surface supplies.
Stakeholders Many stakeholders or issues are not present when debating water policies or in WUOs. Indigenous and peasant farmer groups have been historically underrepresented (Bauer 1998; Davis 2004) . Issues important to them are absent from international discussion of water management in Chile and mentioned occasionally in Chile. Environmental interests are not directly represented either. Stakeholders representing public good items are not present. These interests can include aesthetics and recreation issues associated with rivers and flow regimes.
Single Purpose Planning and Reservoir Operation Evidence of lack of IWRM exists in single purpose planning and reservoir operation for limited objectives, something that continues today to a certain degree and was pervasive through the 1990s. Many hydraulic works during the 1990s (and previously) served primarily single purposes. ENDESA, the privatized national energy company, constructed several reservoirs in the 1990s to maximize power generation. Other private energy companies have developed similar projects. This is not unexpected in that they are in business to produce energy. Operating rules of the conglomeration of energy producers, however, are limited to minimizing cost of energy production, while respecting existing water rights uses. Environmental review of proposed projects and operating requirements at the time were not fully functional and weak requirements were imposed on these projects (which includes social, environmental, and economic impacts). No operational provisions exist for environmental concerns, public goods, or non-water rights title-holders in present reservoir operations. There are limited cases of instream flow requirements on some hydraulic projects, with differing outcomes (Davis & Riestrea 2002) . Pangue dam, completed in 1997, for instance, is not configured in a manner that can release water to mimic the natural flow regime.
The DOH also constructed several dams in the 1990s with a single focus of irrigation. The latest reservoir projects constructed by the DOH, however, are beginning to address multiple uses -both operationally and in their design. The Elqui River dam is the first reservoir in the country with a formal, designated flood pool (Ahumado 2000) .
With the historical development of single focus projects through to the late 1990s, it is doubtful if the optimal location of projects and reservoir operating regimes to achieve and maximum social benefit and sustainable water use are being achieved in Chile's river basins.
Recent Legislative Proposals to Water Management
Increased water user conflicts, water quality degradation, recognition of economic inefficiencies, acknowledgment of ecological flows requirements, and public good issues have led to proposed legislative modifications to the Water Code and promulgation of parallel water quality and environmental legislation.
Since 1991, legislation has been introduced to address some of the perceived gaps in the current Water Code and move towards more sustainable water use practices and IWRM. The overriding themes from the outset were to recapture the 'public good' essence of water and improve water use efficiency. The principal issues addressed were: (1) proposition of watershed management agencies, (2) requirement to use new water titles within a specific time period, (3) requirement of new water titles to possess beneficial use, (4) full legal entitlements of all Water User Organizations (WUO), (5) requirement of local real estate registries to report water transactions to the DGA, (6) recognition of ecological flows, and (8) patent taxes for nonuse of water titles. Stiff opposition was met, and no significant revisions to the Water Code have occurred in the last decade, in fact, reaching political stalemate (Bauer 2004) . Opposition was so pronounced against watershed management, a forum for introducing IWRM, that it was removed from subsequent proposed Water Code modifications.
At the same time, parallel legislation has been passed regarding water quality standards and environmental management (Fuente 1999; Jofré 2003) .
Impediments to Integrated Water Resource Management
General impediments to meeting freshwater objectives of IWRM include inadequate monetary and intellectual resources, fragmentation of authority and responsibility, and inadequate public awareness and involvement (Rast 1999) . These general challenges occur in Chile. Moreover, in Chile impediment to IWRM is highly tied to political ideology and development versus environmental protection debates. Bauer (2004) provides a good summary of the political stalemate on Water Code modification, some of which is described below.
Overall, reluctance to modifications to the Water Code and adopting IWRM remains fierce by special interest groups and politicians. This reluctance is based on strong, historical precedence of local, private sector involvement in water resource distribution, coupled with a strong belief in the neoliberal socio-economic model that forms a significant basis of the Water Code. The code commodifies water rights, allowing private transfers of water rights without regulatory oversight. For critics, a IWRM organization, such as a watershed management corporation, with many attributes and a potentially far-reaching mandate clashes with the ideology of private rights, could impede exercise of water rights and private business activity, and even could infringe upon functions currently performed by government agencies. Several principal issues involved in impeding establishment of IWRM are described further below.
Political History and Public versus Private Debate
Chile's political history strongly influences the way natural resources are managed and ongoing debates on changes to existing legislation. Strong political viewpoints are held on the advantage and disadvantages of the neoliberal market system adopted by the military regime. Some ardently favor market systems as the best allocator of scarce resources. They strongly resist increased public control in water management, for example in terms of system in which a public body can allocate water based on beneficial use and assess multiple objectives and trade-offs. These individuals question whether public institutions and individuals can make these decisions in an unbiased and apolitical way without prejudicing private and economic interests. Opponents argue that the market system undervalues certain aspects, such as the environment and social equity and some sort of mechanism is required to account for market failures and recapture the 'public good' essence of water. Despite strong viewpoints on both sides, the socio-economic system was largely left in tact with transition to democracy. Since then provisions have been slowly introduced in some sectors to better address social and environmental issues (Oppenheim 1999; French-Davis 1999) . These strong political viewpoints arise each time a debate occurs to modify the Water Code.
Congressional Elections and Political Parties
The make up of the Senate and voting system for congressional representation influence the final congressional debate and vote on water issues. 26 senators are elected, two from each region, plus nine appointed senators (and as well as ex-Presidents). The National Security Council (i.e. the military) appoints four of the non-elected senators (Williams and Dougnac 1999) . The four military appointed senators, as well as some of the other appointee seats usually correspond to conservative (right) political parties.
Furthermore, representation in the House of Representatives is based on electoral districts and party representation criteria and not direct vote (Williams and Dougnac 1999) . In some instances if there are two seats within an electoral district up for election, members from the same political party cannot win both seats despite garnering the top two vote totals. Rather the second seat would be awarded to the top vote earner from a second political party, which in some cases has been a conservative political party member. (The congressional majority and president since transition to democracy has been from the left-center coalition party.) The combination of the appointed senators, electoral district representation, and general public support currently provides members of conservative parties a larger voting block than direct vote would have allowed. The conservative parties have tended to defend the Water Code. The result so far has been maintenance of the status quo -i.e. no changes to the Water Code (including introduction of IWRM).
Water User Associations (WUA) Voting Rights and Control Voting rights in local
WUAs, one type of Water User Organization (WUO), are directly proportional to the amount of water rights held. Large water rights holders often are principal business people in their local communities. Changes to the Water Code and movement toward IWRM could be perceived as threatening water rights security and business interests. In addition to large voting rights in WUA decisions, these individuals often wield local political influence. Regardless of political affiliation, local politicians tend to vote in accordance with those who will help to keep them in office. Consequently, many are against changes to the Water Code that could potentially undermine the interests of influential constituents. Again the status quo is maintained.
Restricted Participation of NGO and Communities
Historically, water legislation, planning, and implementation have been highly centralized in specialty sectors. The notable exception is operation and maintenance of local (agricultural) distribution networks. Historically, participation by non-governmental organizations and the wider community has been near non-existent. The political turmoil of the military regime and dictatorship reinforced lack of participation, as human rights abuses occurred and community participation in many facets of Chilean society was discouraged directly or indirectly (Oppenheim 1999) . In some instances, however, water issues, were considered 'safe ground' and were discussed. It appears that even within specialty sectors, serious, open debate about water management did not occur until after transition to democracy in 1990. Wider consultation, at least within the wider water field, was undertaken prior to publication of the national water policy (DGA 1999) . Nascent NGOs now exist, although they still exert minor influence. Nascent community involvement exists as well. It tends however to be limited to participation in environmental impact assessments and user groups directly involved in government hydraulic works (MOPTT 2002) . Currently, many stakeholders are underrepresented in water management decisions. These groups have not historically influenced water management debates, which likely could include provision of services outside existing water management practices, items that potentially would best be achieved through IWRM and watershed management.
Satisfying Basic Needs and Infrastructure
Chile is still a country in development, although in comparison to other developing countries and neighboring countries to the north it is further developed. While coverage is in the high 90% for water supply and sewage collection, universal coverage has not been achieved and wastewater treatment is near 50% (SISS 2003) . Furthermore, farmers in several river basins face unreliable water supply due to lack of infrastructure (Hardy 2001) . Focus continues to be directed toward provision of basic services and infrastructure. While IWRM can contribute to better satisfying basic needs, in Chile and other countries programs tend to address specific water sectors (e.g. potable water supply) and operate outside of an IWRM or watershed management framework, while generally these type of management systems continue to underperform in meeting freshwater management objectives (Rast 1999) .
Development Mindset
There is a strong mindset by some that the country it is in a concentrated development phase. In influential circles, some perceived objectives of IWRM and watershed management, such as habitat conservation and environmental integrity of river systems, clash with development and progress in the country.
For example, in a backroom discussion over the first dam on the Bio Bio River in the early 1990s, Pangue, it was openly debated whether it was appropriate to address downstream environmental concerns and instream flows rather than producing maximum energy (Meier 1995; . At several other water forums and interviews that I attended, unused water (i.e. water that remains in the river and flows to the sea) was considered 'wasted water' by the individuals speaking or the user groups which the individuals were representing (e.g. Carvallo 1998).
Nucleus of Integrated Water Resource Management
Water User Organizations Despite these impediments, incremental steps toward IWRM and watershed management are occurring. The nucleus of watershed management agencies already exists in the form of local water user organizations (WUOs). These WUOs have been afforded legal rights in the Water Code of 1981. They are an outgrowth of a long tradition of private involvement and management in local agricultural communities. Currently, there are three types of WUOs: (1) water communities, (2) water user associations, and (3) watch committees. Watch committees are made up of water users in legally recognized areas, which can be limited to a legal section of a river (more common) or the entire watershed. Agricultural users continue to be most active in watch groups, despite the fact that all users, including hydroelectric, are legally required to participate. For the most part WUOs have been strong, effective local organizations that deal with distribution issues, though usually limited to agricultural communities (Puig 1998 ).
Many of the organizations, however, continue to operate traditionally without full knowledge or regard of the Water Code of 1981. The WUOs have not been able to deal effectively with intersectorial conflicts, disagreements between different organizations, or problems of water quality (Bauer 1998) . There is great disparity among the sophistication and knowledge of watch groups. For example, strong organizations exist in the first legal section of Maipo watershed (Greater Santiago) and in the Elqui and Limarí watersheds (important agricultural areas north of Santiago). The Hydraulic Works Directorate (DOH) has initiated programs to improve WUO management (Puig 1998) .
Existing WUOs would require their legal attributes to be increased, must expand to encompass the entire watershed, and receive training to be effective in a role as a watershed management organization. 
International Sponsored Watershed Management Efforts
Bio Bio River Public-Private Cooperation
The European Union -Latin American (EULA) center was established at the University of Concepción in the early 1990s from an initial European Union grant and capacity at the university. A cooperative research program focused on the environmental and sustainable development of the region was established between the university, individuals from the EU, local and national branches public organizations, and principal private companies in the Bio Bio region. Upon expiration of the initial grant, locals in the Bio Bio region have continued the program. A strong relationship has been established and common objectives fostered.
Planning -Director Plans
As part of its planning role, the DGA engaged water supply and demand assessments for the entire country (IPLA 1996) At the time, however, no provisions were estimated for ecologic purposes nor to allow local communities to sustainably develop. More recently, Director Plans are being developed in four river basins (San José, Aconcagua, Imperial, and Maule). These plans are intended to serve as instruments of indicative planning to maximize social, environmental, and economic goals for public and private organizations (DGA 1999; . These plans are being developed with community consultation. However, these plans possess no legal authority and participation by the private sector is voluntary.
Ambient Water Quality Standards These objectives or standards were established in 2002. To meet ambient water quality standards, co-ordination within a watershed is required to enable setting individual discharge standards to meet certain water quality objectives. In late 2003 transferable discharge permit legislation was promoted. A trail will be undertaken in the Bio Bio River (Jofré 2003) . Water quality models are being developed to serve as a management and decision-making tool to meet ambient water quality standards and to assess transferable discharge permits. The first model developed is in the Bio Bio River because of available information from the EULA, high degree of public and private cooperation in the region, its importance as economic activities and an urban area, and known areas of poor river water quality.
Discussion
In summary, it remains unclear whether IWRM and watershed management in Chile is to be or not to be in the near future. Reluctance may be more reflective of the impression of the 'reach' of an organization than watershed management itself. Where a watershed management corporation (corporación) may be unacceptable, a council (consejo) may be agreeable. While the difference may appear to be simply vocabulary, it is actually in the perceived attributes of the watershed organization. A corporation is often associated with an entity that would carry out its own functions and control many aspects within the watershed, possibly usurping private decisionmaking, as well as functions currently carried out by government agencies. Thus, initial opposition occurred both in the private sector as well as in some government agencies. Nevertheless, while early reaction by some government agencies appeared to be somewhat reticent, in the second half of the 1990s, watershed management has become planning rhetoric at the National Water Directorate (DGA), Hydraulic Works Directorate (DOH), and National Environmental Commission (CONAMA).
The attributes of a council would not be as far-reaching as a corporation, acting as a coordinating and conflict resolution entity. Functions currently performed by private water user groups and government agencies, for example, would continue to be performed after formation of a watershed council. Historical functions, for example, could be contracted to the government agencies by the watershed councils, say to maintain or augment monitoring of water quality or flow measurements. The makeup and functions of council would be tailored to watershed issues and likely dissimilar across the country. Formation of a watershed council is a more likely course of action in Chile.
While enabling legislation remains bogged down, the DGA has progressed Director Plans. A part of these types of plans is to provide improved technical assessment of water supply and demand and clear identification of stresses and trade-offs among uses. Another important part is to forge relationships among various parties, including public and private entities.
Last, Chile's market based water rights system contained in the Water Code of 1981 continues to be praised without fully acknowledging or understating important shortcomings of its water management system (Briscoe et al. 1998; Rodgers & Hall 2003) . Less is mentioned outside of Chile about the strong internal division over modifications to the Water Code and lack of progress on many shortcomings identified over a decade ago (Bauer 2004 ).
The question could be posed is if Chile is managing water better than others, as sustainable water use is practiced in few locations. The argument here is that fundamental objectives of water use and management are not addressed sufficiently in Chile. Consequently, for instance, transplanting its system to another location in its current state without recognition of its shortcomings would be a mistake. Better and more sustainable institutional mechanisms exist or can be created. Lessons learned, however, such as the fallacy that markets equal efficiency equals sustainability need to be noted (Dourojeani & Berrios 1996) . Positive aspects of Chile's 'experiment' in neoliberal treatment of water, such as the importance of flexibility in water rights, can be appended to core management objectives based on sustainable water use and IWRM.
Conclusion
Several preliminary observations can be drawn:
• Water stress occurs in many parts of the country.
• Watersheds are small with relatively few users.
• Regulation of use is governed by several governmental organizations, as well as local water user groups.
• Many deficiencies exist in the current system, including inefficiencies, externalities, lack of stakeholder participation, and unsustainable water use practices.
• Maximum social and sustainable benefits can be achieved through integrated water resource management (IWRM).
• The need for IWRM and watershed management is recognized and is planning rhetoric at many government institutions.
• Private and political interests continue to block their implementation.
• It is doubtful if wholescale implementation of IWRM will occur in the short term due to political stalemate on changes to the Water Code.
• Incremental advances will continue to occur through parallel legislation and operational changes, including water quality management, instream flow reservation, increased involvement of NGOs and community participation, and multiple objective reservoir and hydraulic projects, and water planning (Director Plans).
• Full benefits and sustainable water use, however, cannot be achieved without enabling legislation and sufficient political and private backing.
• A high degree of skepticism should meet any proposal to transplant the Chilean Water Code in its present form to another location.
